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Not Judging by Appearances: 
The Role of Genotype in Jewish Law 
on Intersex Conditions1
Hillel Gray 
Miami University
Jewish communities have always had children with intersex conditions, which 
involve atypical anatomic, chromosomal, or gonadal sex. In the last several de-
cades, Orthodox rabbis have issued ad hoc rulings to assign sex to children and 
adults with intersex conditions. However, rabbinic texts reflect disunity over 
whether to assign gender, for the purposes of Jewish law, according to outward 
appearance or chromosomal makeup. This rabbinic controversy has been exac-
erbated by an increasingly complicated medical picture. Endocrinologists have 
diagnosed more than two dozen intersex conditions, across nine overarching 
congenital types. Such complexity makes it difficult for rabbis to make across-
the-board decisions about gender assignment. This essay examines how rabbinic 
law may change because gender cannot be assigned consistently by chromosom-
al sex—despite the prevalence of this formulaic criterion in rabbinic opinions. 
Consequently, Jewish legal reasoning is poised to shift from a static reliance on 
chromosomal sex. The essay also considers the implications of this trajectory on 
Jewish law towards sex change surgery and transsexuals.
Periodically, a tempest hits the sports world as questions are raised about 
the sexual identity of a female track and field athlete. The sex identity storm 
swirled around Eva Klobukowska (in 1967), Maria Patiño (1985), Santhi 
Soundarajan (2006), and, most recently, 18-year-old South African runner 
Caster Semenya (2009). Despite their female genitalia, these athletes appear 
1An earlier version was presented at the University of Chicago Law School Confer-
ence, “What Pertains to a Man? Transcending Gender Boundaries in Jewish and Israeli 
Law,” March 1, 2010. The author appreciates his in-depth discussions with Michael Broyde 
as well as feedback from Jennifer Moran and Ellen Feder, among others.
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masculine insofar as they lack certain female secondary sexual characteristics, 
such as breast development and wide hips.2 If her chromosomes are “male” 
(i.e., XY) and her testosterone levels are elevated, should such a runner qualify 
as a female athlete? In February 2010, the IOC convened a symposium for 
experts to reach a common understanding of how sexual ambiguities should 
be handled. It is sports authorities who find themselves trying to resolve these 
rare cases of sex assignment because, in Western countries, sports is one of the 
few domains in which it is legal to differentiate between males and females. 
Differential treatment is prohibited in many other areas, including employ-
ment, housing, medical care, and education. Granted, discrimination by sex 
roles remains embedded in cultural attitudes and practices, but the law steers 
decision-makers toward undifferentiated treatment. Besides sports, religion is 
another domain that is permitted to treat people differently because of their 
sexual identity. In Roman Catholicism and Islam, for instance, women may 
be limited to particular ecclesiastical roles, ritual functions, and religious or-
ders. In traditionalist Jewish culture, the differential treatment of men and 
women puts considerable pressure on any ambiguities or uncertainties in 
gender identity. In Orthodox Jewish life, any person who does not conform 
to the conventional gender binary also does not fit neatly into social spaces 
and religious practices. Gender shapes more than Jewish marriage and family 
law. Orthodox social space is choreographed by informal rules and Jewish law, 
governing physical contact, ritual segregation, seclusion, text study, and inter-
action between the sexes. In religious practices, men’s obligations and ritual 
roles differ markedly from women’s. Adherents of Jewish praxis are expected 
to act in line with their gender identity and, accordingly, face strong incentives 
to resolve any uncertainties. 
During the last 40 years, Jewish legal discourse has confronted new un-
certainties about the assignment of gender because surgery and hormonal 
treatments have made it increasingly possible to modify sex organs and sexual 
characteristics. Specifically, rabbinic authorities have rendered opinions about 
two kinds of people with atypical gender situations: transsexuals and people 
with intersex conditions.3 While intersex births are quite rare, they pose pre-
2Ariel Levy, “Either/Or Sports, Sex, and the Case of Caster Semenya,” The New York-
er, Vol. 30 (2009); Erin E. Buzuvis, “Caster Semenya and the Myth of the Level Playing 
Field,” http://ssrn.com/abstract=1521674, retrieved December 10, 2009; Laura A. Wack-
witz, “Verifying the Myth: Olympic Sex Testing and the Category ‘Woman’,” Women’s Stud-
ies Intl. Forum, Vol. 26, No. 6 (December 2003): 553–560.
3Terminology. This paper uses intersex to encompass conditions that could be diag-
nosed medically as disorders of sex development (DSD). Sex change surgery (SCS) is used to 
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cisely the kind of dilemma that engenders rabbinic decision-making. While 
this paper focuses on the pivotal case of persons with intersex conditions, it 
is equally important to see how rabbis have assigned halakhic gender to trans-
sexuals. Due to the aforementioned pressures within Orthodoxy to clarify 
gender, rabbinic scholars have sought to articulate a decision rule for gender 
assignment that applies uniformly to both transsexual and intersex situations. 
However, a generalized decision rule does not mesh with the biophysical 
diversity of intersex. In cases of unresolved sexual identity, a leading approach 
to halakhic gender assignment holds that gender should be based on genetic 
information, that is, genotype. While this genotype formula rests on the un-
deniable appeal of a modern scientific fact, is it tenable? As I will argue below, 
this dominant approach to gender assignment is incompatible with Jewish law. 
As the genotype approach is challenged and revised, the shift in Jewish law and 
ethics will change how rare intersex conditions, for both children and adults, 
are handled in Orthodox Jewish communities. Moreover, if gender were to no 
longer be conceptualized in terms of genetic data, halakhic conversations over 
transsexuality could move into a new phase as well. While this paper does 
not aim to change Jewish law per se, it demonstrates the factual and analytical 
grounds to reject a formulaic reliance of genotypic gender. At the same time, 
we can begin to uncover the sociohistorical dynamics that have enabled the 
primacy of genotypic gender assignment to continue to the present day.
A. Genitalia or Genetics: Jewish Legal Ambivalence over Sexual 
Ambiguity4
In facing gender assignment problems, Orthodox Jewish medical ethicists dif-
ferentiate between two sexually atypical groups: transsexual adults and people 
with intersex conditions. On the one hand, Orthodox rabbinical authorities 
refer to gender reassignment surgery in order to avoid presupposing that the surgery itself re-
assigns gender under Jewish law. Transsexuals refers, for the purposes here, to non-intersex 
persons who seek or have obtained sex change surgery. As a default, the paper may assume 
male-to-female (MTF) changes, which are more prevalent and receive more attention in 
rabbinic literature. Halakhic gender refers to a person’s gender assignment for purposes of 
Jewish law.
4A note on sources cited in this article: Responsa are found in Tzitz Eliezer (Eliezer 
Waldenberg’s responsa, Jerusalem), Mishneh Halakhot (Menashe Klein, Machon Mishneh 
Halakhot Gedolot, n.p., 5763/2003), Sheilat Shaul (Shaul Breisch, Bnai Brak 5756/1996) 
Yaskil Avdi ( Jerusalem: Ovadiah Hadaya, 5691/1931). Avraham S. Avraham, Nishmat 
Avraham, second edition ( Jerusalem, 5767/2007). “T” refers to a second responsa collec-
tion. Even ha-Ezer (EH) and Yoreh De’ah (YD) refer to sections of Jewish law codes.
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oppose efforts by transsexual adults to change their sex, whether through 
surgery or hormonal treatment. No Orthodox rabbinic decisor accepts sex-
ual transition as the proper management of gender dysphoria. Sex change 
surgery is said to violate biblical law, especially a rule against castration. Sex 
change surgery also has been said to violate prohibitions on cross-dressing, 
self-wounding, self-endangerment, and enabling sin.5 When confronted with 
a person who had sex reassignment surgery, Orthodox rabbis do not concede 
post facto that a man can become a woman, or vice versa, for halakhic ( Jewish 
law) purposes. On the other hand, Orthodox medical ethicists are receptive to 
surgical interventions for children with ambiguous genitalia or other intersex 
conditions. Surgery often has been approved because, in the hyperbolic words 
of the American Academy of Pediatrics, the birth of such children pose a “so-
cial emergency.” In the United States, parents and physicians typically move 
quickly to resolve anatomical anomalies and ambiguities—they settle on a sex 
for their infant. Orthodox rabbis have approved pediatric surgery, by making 
exceptions to biblical law, and recognized the concomitant gender assignment. 
This same reasoning applies to adults with intersex conditions.6
While surgeries for transsexual adults and intersex children have been 
judged differently in practice, the Jewish legal sources and reasoning for sex as-
signment are related. Jewish law scholars tend to assume that a single decision 
rule, a new formula in Jewish law, can help guide Jewish law decisions towards 
both transsexual adults and intersex children. However, for the past 40 years, 
Ashkenazi Orthodox opinion has been divided over whether to apply a geno-
typic or phenotypic formula.7 Some Orthodox rabbis have adopted the for-
mula that halakhic gender is determined genetically by chromosomal sex, i.e., 
5See Edan Ben-Ephraim, Sefer Dor Tahepuchot (“The Generation of Perversions”) ( Je-
rusalem: Ben-Ephraim Family, 5764): 43–67, who also cites violations of desecrating God’s 
name, changing the order of creation, causing suffering to one’s parents and family, and 
nullifying the duty to procreate. 
6Adult surgery for intersex conditions could be approved on the same grounds as for 
children. In the only adult intersex case I have seen, though, Menashe Klein disapproved of 
the surgery for health reasons. 
7The phenotype-genotype distinction is found in Menashe Klein, Mishneh Halakhot 
T VI:47 (letter undated, folume 5763/2003), p. 126; cf. Avraham Steinberg, Encyclopedia 
of Jewish Medical Ethics, trans. Fred Rosner (New York: Feldheim Publishers, 2003), Vol. 
4, p. 1037. For the purposes of this paper, sexual phenotype refers to external appearances 
only, mainly the primary genitalia. Genotype herein refers to other biophysical determi-
nants of sex: genetic and chromosomal sex, but also internal anatomical and physiological 
features, which might otherwise be categorized as phenotype. 
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genotype. Conversely, other Orthodox medical ethicists argue that halakhic 
gender should be determined by the external appearance of the genitalia, i.e., 
phenotypic gender assignment.8 
The halakhic dispute over gender assignment was sparked, in effect, by the 
halakhic guideline first adopted by Eliezer Waldenberg. Over the course of a 
few years, Rabbi Waldenberg ruled on both an adult transsexual and a pedi-
atric intersex case by using the same decision formula. In a responsum about 
transsexuals and marriage, Waldenberg ruled in 1967 that sex change surgery 
would alter a person’s halakhic gender.9 As analogous precedents, he invoked 
two pre-modern responsa that had annulled the marriages of women who had 
reportedly changed into men by natural causes.10 Similarly, reasoned Walden-
berg, sex change surgery would automatically dissolve a transsexual’s marriage, 
without the need for a traditional Jewish divorce document.11 Waldenberg’s 
8For Conservative Judaism, the Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Rab-
binical Assembly approved a responsum that recognizes gender reassignment through sex 
change surgery, relying on Waldenberg’s phenotype approach (Mayer E. Rabinowitz, “Sta-
tus of Transsexuals,” Committee on Jewish Law and Standards, 2003; available through 
http://huc/edu/ijso/PoliciesResponsa/.) Leonard A. Sharzer has proposed that trans-
sexuals be assigned halakhic gender based on neither genotype nor phenotype, but on psy-
chological grounds (i.e., gender dysphoria syndrome). 
For Reform Judaism, since it no longer makes religious distinctions between genders, 
halakhic gender is a theoretical question (Central Conference of American rabbis [CCAR] 
Responsa Committee, “Circumcision of a Transgender Female” 5769 [2009]). Previously, 
in 1977, Solomon B. Freehof was “ambivalent and suggested that the rabbis be guided by 
the attitude of the community,” according to CCAR Responsa Committee, “Conversion 
and Marriage after  Transsexual Surgery” 5750.8 (1990). Similar doubts were raised in 
a 1990 responsum (5750.8), concerning a man who underwent sex change surgery to be 
female, but subsequently sought to marry as a man. Advising against the marriage, the re-
sponsum found that the person had an indeterminate halakhic gender, thereby weighing 
both phenotype and genotype.
9Eliezer Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, X:25.26.6 (20 Shvat 5727, January 30, 1967).
10These cases may have involved 46,XY persons who appear female as children, due 
to a DSD that suppresses fetal androgen synthesis, but whose phenotype changes dur-
ing puberty, due to testosterone activity. Cf. Peggy T. Cohen-Kettenis, “Gender Change 
in 46,XY Persons with 5α-Reductase-2 Deficiency and 17β-Hydroxysteroid Dehydroge-
nase-3 Deficiency,” Archives of Sexual Behavior, Vol. 34, No. 4 (August 2005): 399–410.
11Tzitz Eliezer X:25.26.6 (20 Shvat 5727, January 30, 1967). The responsum also re-
ports the view that an FTM transsexual should say an adjusted morning blessing, “Blessed 
are You, Our God, King of the Universe, who has changed me to a man.” Exactly thirty 
years later, Tzitz Eliezer XXII:2 ( January 30, 1997) considers the MTF transsexual situ-
ation and quotes again several key precedents. However, here Waldenberg concludes that 
the law of androginos or tumtum would apply. Since androginos and tumtum are cases of 
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responsum clearly relies on a phenotype decision rule, which he does articulate 
in the following intersex case.
In November 1970, Dr. Eli Schussheim wrote to Waldenberg, who served 
as the halakhic advisor for a leading Israeli hospital (Shaare Zedek Medical 
Center), about a pediatric case of atypical genitalia. By all external appear-
ances, by phenotype, the infant had female genitalia. In terms of genotype, 
though, the infant had been tested and found to be a chromosomal male. In 
addition, physicians found a single testis, a lump within one of the infant’s 
labia. Schussheim wanted to know if, under Jewish law, this genetically male 
infant could be raised as female, in line with the medical team’s recommenda-
tion, and the single testis surgically excised, despite the biblical law against 
castration. One of the leading figures in Jewish medical ethics, Waldenberg 
replied that the testis could be removed and the child raised as female.12 At 
the heart of his responsum, Waldenberg asserted that the sexual identity of a 
person, for halakhic purposes, should be based on the external appearance of 
the sexual organs. 
The infant in question, as you described it in your letter, has external organs that 
appear to be female and has no external indication of male genitalia. It was only 
special tests that were administered to the infant that revealed that internally 
there were male cells in its body. Therefore, as I said, my opinion is that if we 
leave the infant as is, the child would be ruled a female since the external [sex] or-
gans, visible to the eye, are what establishes the halakhah. (Incidentally, I heard from 
a doctor that there are certain hormones common to both males and females and 
the determining factor [of sex] is which hormones comprise a majority. There-
fore, it is clear that only the actual, external organs, which are different in males and 
females, determine sex in practice).13  
doubtful, indeterminate halakhic gender (cf. CCAR 5750.8), it appears that Waldenberg 
is taking into account both the phenotype and the genotype. If so, he has shifted from his 
earlier ruling.
12Waldenberg, Tzitz Eliezer, XI:78 (11 Markheshvan 5731, November 10, 1970), Je-
rusalem. At the end of the responsum, Waldenberg added a comment about the law of 
androginos, which he said did not apply to the 46,XY-DSD infant: “A hermaphrodite [an-
droginos] may undergo surgery in order to establish one sexual identity. If possible, the 
male organs should preferably be preserved and reconstructed. However, if circumstances 
are such that it would be more advisable to transform the child into a phenotypic female, 
the surgeon may do so” (Steinberg, Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol. 4 [1980], pp. 
122f.; 2003, pp. 469 and 1037).
13Translation by Hillel Gray and Joshua Schreier, emphasis added. Cf. Mayer Rabi-
nowitz, Status Of Transsexuals (Committee on Jewish Law and Standards of the Rabbinical 
Assembly, December 3, 2003; http://huc.edu/ijso/PoliciesResponsa/).
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With this statement, Waldenberg asserts that halakhic gender is deter-
mined by the visible genitalia, i.e., the phenotype. Waldenberg’s opinion be-
came the emblematic precedent, in Jewish legal discourse, for the view that 
halakhic gender is determined by phenotype. Eventually, the phenotype ap-
proach came to be supported by a few other rabbis, including Menashe Klein 
in 1993.14 
In the 1970s and 1980s, though, Waldenberg’s view met strong opposi-
tion. A number of influential Orthodox rabbis disputed Waldenberg’s formula 
for gender assignment based on phenotype. Instead, topnotch Jewish medical 
ethicists in Israel and the U.S. wrote that rabbinic opinion favored gender de-
termination based on genetic make-up, genotype. Notably, in his award-win-
ning encyclopedia of medical halakhah, Avraham Steinberg cites several other 
rabbinic authorities who reject Waldenberg’s phenotype formula.15 Steinberg 
declares that, contrary to Waldenberg:
Others have written that surgery which changes sexual appearance has no effect 
on the person’s halakhic status as it is clear that no biogenetic change has occurred 
and the change is merely external.”16 
14Notably, see Meir Amsel, “On sex change surgery [Heb.],” Ha-Maor, Vol. 25, No. 2 
(Kislev-Tevet 5733/1972): 14–21, who views surgery as a total change in gender, though 
he also adumbrates the opposing view. Klein elaborates on a position against genotype in 
Mishneh Halakhot (T VI:47). Edan Ben-Ephraim argues strongly for a natal phenotype 
approach in his 2004 monograph on transsexuality, Sefer Dor Tahepuchot (“The Generation 
of Perversions”), p. 112ff. Ben-Ephraim cites rabbinic opinions in support of phenotype, 
including a letter appended by Rabbi Asher Weiss. Ben-Ephraim also infers support for 
phenotypic gender assignment from Hayyim Greinman (Sefer Hidushim u-Beurim. Kiddu-
shin EH 44, p. 104.3, s.v. ve-hineh), Shaul Breisch (Sheilat Shaul, EH 9.1–2), and Yehoshua 
Neuwirth (oral communication cited in Nishmat Avraham, expanded second edition, YD 
262.11, p. 326). But see Neuwirth’s objection to Waldenberg’s reasoning on intersex assign-
ment to female (Nishmat Avraham EH 44.2, p.268). 
15Five sources are cited in Steinberg, Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, 4: Ova-
diah Hadaya; Yaskil Avdi 7 EH 4 (an undated responsum from an anthology published 
in 1931); Avraham Hirsch,  “Artificial Transformation of a Male to a Female and of a Fe-
male to a Male,” Noam, Vol. 16 (5733/1973); Aryeh Grosnass, “Extraordinary Incident 
of a Man Who Changed to a Woman,” Lev Aryeh 2:49 (undated letter, published 1973); 
Moshe Steinberg, “Sex Change for Androginos,” Assia, Vol. 1: 144ff.; Avraham S. Avraham, 
Nishmat Avraham EH 44:2. Grosnass refers neither to Waldenberg nor to genotype per 
se. While Steinberg does not refer to genotype either, he does mention Waldenberg, albeit 
only in regard to an androginos, i.e., a person with both male and female genitalia. Hirsch 
disputes Amsel but does not mention genotype.
16Steinberg, Encyclopedia of Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol. 4, p. 1037, emphasis added.
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Similarly, Waldenberg’s approach was opposed by Abraham S. Abraham, 
the Israeli author of a multi-volume rabbinic code on medical halakhah, Nish-
mat Avraham. In his code, Abraham relies on the preeminent halakhic decisor 
(posek) Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, as well as Yosef Shalom Eliashiv, another 
major Jewish law decisor.17 
In the United States, the genotypic gender assignment was explicitly sup-
ported by Rabbi Moshe D. Tendler and Dr. Fred Rosner, two leading Ameri-
can Jewish medical ethicists in the United States. In his influential Jewish law 
column for American Orthodoxy’s flagship journal Tradition, another leading 
medical ethicist, Rabbi J. David Bleich, also sides with the genotype approach, 
which he says is “particularly cogent in view of the fact that fertile organs of the 
opposite sex cannot be acquired by means of surgery.”18 Tendler and Rosner 
issued an important precedent on genotypic gender in a statement that was 
favorably reviewed by Rabbi Moshe Feinstein. Feinstein was the leading Jew-
ish law authority in North America, possibly the world, during the latter half 
of the twentieth century. As Feinstein’s son-in-law and a biologist, Tendler 
worked closely with the prolific posek on medical issues. Whereas Feinstein 
wrote only in a Hebrew interwoven with arcane Talmudic language, Tendler 
translated his rulings and helped popularize Jewish medical ethics for a broad-
17In Nishmat Avraham, an important collection of rulings and opinions on medical 
halakhah by Avraham S. Avraham, Auerbach seems to distance himself from Waldenberg’s 
method (Nishmat Avraham 44:2, p. 268), though Waldenberg is reported more favorably, 
with support from Yehoshua Neuwirth, at YD 262.12 (p. 326).
Eliashiv discusses a patient with AIS symptoms: female genitalia; no uterus, ovaries, 
or mons pubis; and testes inside the abdomen. Eliashiv expresses concern that the patient 
is a possible male (safek zakhar). Were the patient a “possible male,” then sexual relations 
with another male would violate rabbinic law. For our purposes, given his concern with the 
male aspect (known via chromosomes or the internal testes), Eliashiv clearly is not satisfied 
with the phenotypic formula for halakhic gender (Yosef Shalom Eliashiv, “Plastic Surgery 
to Determine a Newborn’s Sex,” B’shvilei Refua’h, Vol. 2 [5739/1979]).
Nonetheless, Auerbach and Eliashiv do not refer to the patient’s genotype per se. Their 
opposition to Waldenberg is characterized in terms of genetic makeup by Steinberg and 
Broyde. See also Jonathan Wiesen and David Kulak, “‘Male and Female He Created Them’: 
Revisiting Gender Assignment and Treatment in Intersex Children,” Journal of Halacha & 
Contemporary Society, Vol. 54 (2007): 5–29.
18J. David Bleich, “Survey of Recent Halakhic Periodical Literature: Transsexual Sur-
gery,” Tradition (1974), p. 96. Broyde reaches a similar conclusion as he rejects Waldenberg’s 
phenotypic approach (Michael J. Broyde, “Appendix: Sex Change Operations and Their 
Effect on Marital Status: A Brief Comparison” in ‘The Establishment of Maternity & Pa-
ternity in Jewish and American Law’,” National Jewish Law Review, Vol. 3 [n.d.], http://jlaw.
com/Articles/maternity_appendix.html).
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er audience. Tendler and Rosner’s statement was provided to the Association 
of Orthodox Jewish Scientists and published in their guidebook, Practical 
Medical Halacha. The statement declared that: 
The sex determination of an infant or child with ambiguous genitalia must be 
based on cytological and genetic (i.e., medical) evidence, not on psychological 
considerations. The presence of testes is to be considered an absolute sign of male-
ness. A genetically male infant must not be surgically modified to permit rearing him 
as a female. 
 His inability to function as the male partner in marital relations is not 
adequate justification for such a sex change.19 
During the 1970s, Feinstein did not publish any responsa himself that 
affirmed the Tendler and Rosner formulation, above, of an across-the-board 
decision rule for pediatric gender assignment based on genotype. Nonetheless, 
Feinstein did write a letter in 1985 that ruled against phenotype (i.e., physical 
appearance), in favor of genotype, for a specific pediatric case. Based on the 
case description, the situation facing Feinstein may have been virilization of 
female genitalia, e.g., due to congenital adrenal hyperplasia. His letter deals 
with the newborn’s intersex condition: “Her body by its appearance seems to 
be the male sex from the outside. However, upon genetic examination of her 
blood, it appears that she is female.” Feinstein hereby affirms the recommenda-
tion of the medical team that this newborn be raised female, with the expecta-
tion that she would be able to give birth as well.20
In short, then, sex should be determined by genotype, according to senior 
Orthodox halakhic authorities and leading Jewish medical ethicists. Further-
more, this guideline apparently determines the sex not only for persons with 
ambiguous genitalia but also for transsexuals. That is, since a male who transi-
tions to a female (MTF) remains genetically male, the MTF transsexual con-
tinues to be assigned the halakhic gender of a male. 
19Tendler and Rosner, Practical Medical Halacha (New York: Rephael Society Feld-
heim Publishers, 1980), p. 41, emphasis added. “In true hermaphroditism, or when no 
clearly differentiated gonad is evident, the decision as to the sex identity of the child must 
be arrived at by careful consultation with competent medical and Rabbinic authorities” 
(AOJS Halacha Bulletin [undated]; http://www.aojs.org/pmh.asp#2).
20See also note 58. Moshe Feinstein, “On the circumcision of an intersex newborn 
female,” [Heb.] in Igrot Moshe, Vol. 3, prepublication excerpt (New York, 2010). Original 
translation.
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B. The Test Case: “Male” Chromosomes and “Female” Genitalia
Can Jewish law consistently determine the gender of intersex persons by the 
presence of male or female chromosomes? To discover whether genotypic 
gender would be a foolish consistency, it should suffice to identify “test cases” 
in which a person’s genotype and phenotype do not match. Generally, people 
with male bodies have male chromosomes, people with female bodies have 
female chromosomes. In some intersex conditions, though, a person may have 
a “sex reversal,” whereby genotype and phenotype seem to conflict. These sex 
reversals put the Jewish law dispute over gender assignment into sharp relief. 
In female sex reversals, female genitalia are fully or partially manifested with a 
male (XY) genotype. Such reversals occur with about a dozen intersex condi-
tions. Medically, these syndromes are now termed 46,XY Disorders of Sexual 
Development. These DSDs are closely related, and it is difficult, clinically, to 
distinguish among these conditions: “only 50% of 46,XY children with DSD 
will receive a definitive diagnosis.”21 To test a rigid genotypic assignment of 
halakhic gender, phenotypes should be considered from the 46,XY DSDs with 
female genitalia (fg), henceforth termed XY/fg. 
Female sex reversal can be seen clearly among people who have complete 
or partial Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS).22 AIS reduces or elimi-
nates the usual impact of male hormones, androgens, on the body. Individuals 
with Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (CAIS) have ordinary male 
(XY) chromosomes and female external genitalia. The genitalia include labia 
and a vaginal canal. The CAIS child does not have internal female reproduc-
tive organs; instead, the child may have testes below the surface of the skin, 
not in a scrotum, perhaps in the abdomen. The testes generate testosterone, 
which with CAIS is transformed naturally into usable estrogen. Surgery can 
remove the testes and modify the vagina. In short, as in Waldenberg’s case, the 
CAIS child has a female phenotype, albeit atypical, yet a male genotype. CAIS 
21I. A. Hughes et al., “Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders,” 
Archives of Disease in Childhood, Vol. 91, No. 7 ( July 2006): 554–563. CAIS, PAIS, and 
Lipoid CAH are “46,XY DSDs in androgen synthesis or action” and Swyer syndrome is a 
disorder of gonadal development. This article uses “XY/fg” to refer only to those syndromes 
where individual have a phenotypic manifestation of female external genitalia. This excludes 
46,XY DSD varieties with male or ambiguous genitalia. See Table 5, Hughes et al., “Con-
sensus Statement on Management of Intersex Disorders.” While the term sex reversal is dep-
recated nomenclature, it is used herein due to its relevance to the halakhic analysis.
22AIS covers a continuum of developmental effects, so partial AIS may result in a 
natal or transitional gender assignment as male. 
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persons are currently and consistently raised as female, without much surgical 
intervention or gender dysphoria.23 
AIS covers a spectrum of phenotypes, depending on the degree of resis-
tance to androgen. With the higher levels of resistance, a child with Partial 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (PAIS) may be similar to CAIS. But PAIS 
allows some effect from androgens, so adults with partial AIS may have more 
masculine secondary sexual characteristics, to match their male (XY) chro-
mosomes. Nonetheless, they may have fully formed external female genitalia. 
Besides AIS, there are about a dozen DSD syndromes that can cause fe-
male sex reversal.24 With congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), for instance, 
persons with male chromosomes may have internal or undescended testes and 
manifest female external genitalia.25 With Swyer syndrome, gonadal abnor-
malities cause delayed puberty and amenorrhea. Swyer syndrome combines a 
male genotype with unmistakably female genitalia.26
Were halakhic gender determined by genotype, then all female sex reversal 
cases, whether due to AIS or Swyer syndrome or another DSD, should be as-
signed the gender to match their chromosomal sex. That is, every XY person 
with female genitalia would be classified as a halakhic male. Conversely, under 
Waldenberg’s phenotype approach, these same intersex individuals would be 
classified as a halakhic female. Which view is correct? For better or worse, Jew-
ish law lacks a definition of male or female that can answer this question. It 
goes without saying that before sex chromosome testing became available in 
the twentieth century, phenotype was the only way to assign gender. Jewish 
23A. B Wisniewski et al., “Complete Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome: Long-term 
Medical, Surgical, and Psychosexual Outcome,” Journal of Clinical Endocrinology & Metabo-
lism, Vol. 85, No. 8 (2000): 2664. Half of the women had vaginoplasty and most reported 
satisfaction with libido and sexual function. All reported satisfaction with being a woman. 
24Marta Berra et al., “Long-term Health Issues of Women with XY Karyotype,” Ma-
turitas, Vol. 65, No. 2 (February 2010): 172-178.
25CAH due to 17-alpha-hydroxylase deficiency includes 46,XY individuals with fe-
male phenotypes but without female secondary sexual characteristics (see Online Men-
delian Inheritance in Man (OMIM), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/dispomim.
cgi?id=202110. ) With lipoid congenital adrenal hyperplasia, 46,XY individuals are phe-
notypic females; however, the condition requires medical care from infancy. (See OMIM, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez.dispomim.cgi?id=201710. 
26L. Michala et al., “Swyer Syndrome: Presentation and Outcomes,” BJOG: An In-
ternational Journal of Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Vol. 115, No. 6 (May 2008): 737–741. 
Swyer syndrome is also known as: 46,XY complete gonadal dysgenesis. The condition is 
often related to a problem with the SRY (sex-determining region Y) gene, but other genetic 
variations can also cause this syndrome.
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law took it for granted that males and females could be identified by genitalia, 
so it had no need to legally define the sexes. ( Jewish law did codify defini-
tions—androginos and tumtum—for those rare individuals whose genitalia 
eluded an unambiguous phenotypic assignment.27) Fortuitously, Talmudic law 
did define a category of persons with female genitalia but atypical secondary 
sexual traits. Known as aylonit, this category can assign a halakhic gender to 
the test case, the female sex reversal, without presupposing a priori that either 
phenotype or genotype are decisive.28
To settle the halakhic gender for female sex reversals, the first step is to 
demonstrate that some XY/fg individuals satisfy the criteria for an aylonit. 
According to rabbinic law, a woman is assumed to be an aylonit at age 20 if she 
does not present (i) the rabbinic indicator of puberty, which is pubic hair.29 
The aylonit would then be classified in terms of four additional indicia: (ii) 
pre-pubescent breasts, (iii) difficulty during sexual intercourse,30 (iv) narrow, 
pre-pubescent hips,31 and (v) a thick voice, indistinguishable between a wom-
an and a man.32 In addition, the aylonit is understood to be infertile. These 
indicia have long been established, based on Talmudic texts, in the authorita-
tive code of rabbinic law, Joseph Karo’s Shulchan Aruch, which is glossed for 
Ashkenazi Jews by Moshe Isserles. Ideally, the aylonit is expected to present all 
five indicia. If a person had more feminine characteristics, such as wide hips 
and a high-pitched voice, she could be designated simply as a female (nekevah). 
27Charlotte Elisheva Fonrobert, “Gender Identity In Halakhic Discourse,” Jewish 
Women: A Comprehensive Historical Encyclopedia ( Jewish Womens Archive, 01 2009), 
http://data.ccarnet.org/cgi-bin/respdisp.pl?file=8&year=5750; Steinberg, Encyclopedia of 
Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol. 4.
28For people with male genitalia and atypical secondary sex characteristics, compare 
the Talmudic category, saris hamah ( Julian H. Barth and Moshe Zemer, “The Congenital 
Eunuch: A Medical-Halachic Study,” Jewish Medical Ethics, Vol. 2 [1995]: 44–50; Sarra 
Lev, “How the  ‘Aylonit’ Got Her Sex,” AJS Review, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2007]).
29In Talmudic law, puberty is indicated by two pubic hairs. See “Gedolah” in Encyclo-
pedia Talmudit, Vol. 5.
30The difficulty may be physical discomfort or a lack of desire (“Aylonit,” Encyclopedia 
Talmudit [ET], n.d., citing Rashi Yev 80b and Maimonides on mYev 1.1).
31According to another interpretation of an ambiguous rabbinic phrase, this criterion 
may refer to a pre-pubescent mons pubis.
32ET, citing Yevamot 80b. In his gloss on the Shulchan Aruch (EH 172.11), Moshe 
Isserles states that the aylonit has the nature or natural qualities of a man (yesh la teva ha-
zachar).
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Nevertheless, some rabbinic authorities hold that even a single, unambiguous 
characteristic would suffice to define an aylonit.33 
The aylonit indicia can be tested against the phenotypic range of XY/fg 
conditions.34 With AIS, women are situated along a continuum of sexual char-
acteristics. The more CAIS reduces the effect of androgens, the more likely an 
individual would manifest feminine characteristics. Women with CAIS (AIS 
grade 7) lack pubic hair, a key criterion for the aylonit. In addition, the vagina 
of a woman with CAIS is ordinarily shallow, so intercourse may be painful or 
difficult, in line with that criterion for aylonit.35 The CAIS phenotype does not 
necessarily coincide with the remaining aylonit criteria. Breast development 
and hip width are ordinary, though CAIS women might be less feminized due 
to the usual variability of secondary sexual traits. Historically, CAIS adults 
include those with quite feminine secondary sexual characteristics, who would 
certainly have been accepted as halakhic women. No rabbinic authority has 
ever doubted that an adult with feminine breasts, hips, and vagina would be a 
halakhic woman, even though she lacks female internal organs and (possibly) 
pubic hair.
On the other hand, a woman with Partial AIS (grade 6), as compared to 
CAIS, could have less development of secondary female sex characteristics, 
such as breasts, wide hips, and voice.36 Anatomically, like CAIS, PAIS results 
in a shallow vagina and, consequently, the possibility of difficult intercourse. 
But PAIS does entail somewhat more pubic hair than CAIS. Thus, PAIS 
women could fit four of the five criteria for aylonit.
With Swyer’s Syndrome,37 women may readily fit the aylonit criteria of 
scanty pubic hair and minimal breast development.38 Moreover, due to the 
33ET, at footnote 11, with sources cited there.
34The author appreciates the detailed advice, especially on the characteristics of per-
sons with 46,XY conditions, in correspondence with Sherri G. Morris and Margaret Sim-
monds. The views expressed herein regarding these characteristics, and any errors in fact or 
judgment, are solely the author’s responsibility.
35Berra et al., “Long-term Health Issues of Women with XY Karyotype,” Anecdotal 
evidence obtained from the AIS Support Group, http://www.aissg.org.
36A. L. M. Boehmer, et al, “Genotype versus Phenotype in Families with Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome,” Journal of Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism, Vol. 86, No. 9 
(2001): 4154f.
37Swyer syndrome is also known as complete gonadal dysgenesis (Michala et al., “Sw-
yer Syndrome: Presentation and Outcomes”).
38Michala et al., “Swyer Syndrome; H. Siddique, P. Daggett, and K. Artley, “Successful 
Term Vaginal Delivery in a 46,XY Woman,” International Journal of Gynecology & Obstet-
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syndrome’s estrogen deficiency, women with Swyer’s can lack other secondary 
sexual characteristics, such as wide hips. Unlike AIS, women with Swyer’s 
typically have a normal vagina and uterus, so they can give birth with assisted 
reproduction technologies.39 
Several other DSDs could have individuals who fit some of the aylonit 
criteria. Besides AIS and Swyer’s, individuals with male genotypes (XY) could 
present as females through 10 clinical syndromes.40 These XY/fg syndromes 
are more rare, though, and they often have problematic phenotypic and health 
profiles, so they are not likely candidates for the aylonit designation, at least 
as it was used in historical practice. Still, such sex reversal cases offer further 
evidence that halakhic gender should not be assigned by chromosomal sex. 
From the foregoing evidence, it is certain that persons with an XY/fg con-
dition could fulfill some or most of the five indicia of an aylonit to a tee. What 
then is the halakhic gender of an aylonit? Jewish law is absolutely clear that 
the aylonit is a female. It is true that the aylonit’s age of majority is a matter of 
rabbinic dispute. Well after the default age of majority (i.e., 12 years old), the 
aylonit may be relegated to the status of a girl because she lacks the usual sign 
for adulthood, pubic hair.41 But this dispute is unrelated to the consideration 
of her gender. There is no hint anywhere in rabbinic literature that an aylonit 
could possibly be a halakhic male. For those XY/fg persons who ought to be 
defined as an aylonit, Jewish law must recognize her as a female, despite her 
“male” chromosomes. 
Thus, the XY/fg case can prove conclusively that only the phenotype—
but not the male genotype—would determine halakhic gender for certain in-
tersex people. In short, the test case demonstrates a multi-step equivalence: a 
given XY/fg (male genotype, female phenotype) is an aylonit, who in turn is 
a halakhic female.42 Since some XY/fg persons would indisputably qualify as 
rics, Vol. 101, No. 3 ( June 2008): 298–299; Mary’s Story, AISSG, http://www.aissg.org. 
Of the aylonit criteria, women with Swyer may be least predisposed to have a masculine 
voice or difficulty with sex.
39Catherine L. Minto et al., “XY Females: Revisiting the Diagnosis,” BJOG: An Inter-
national Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Vol. 112, No. 10 (October 2005): 1407–1410.
40Marta Berra et al., “Long-term Health Issues of Women with XY Karyotype,” Ma-
turitas, Vol. 65, No. 2 (2010): 174, and Catherine L. Minto et al, “XY Females: Revisiting 
the Diagnosis.” BJOG: An International Journal of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Vol. 112, No. 
10 (2005): 1407–1410.
41“Aylonit,” Encyclopedia Talmudit, section 2. 
42Some rabbinic authorities would classify a Jew with an XY/fg condition as aylonit 
only if she meets all five indicia. In such cases, exemplified by CAIS, the person would be 
defined as an ordinary, non-aylonit female. 
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aylonit women, only a phenotypic assignment of halakhic gender can be correct 
for this test case. 
To be sure, this paper is not the first to recognize that an XY/fg person 
might be characterized properly as an aylonit. For instance, this possibility was 
specifically mentioned by Menashe Klein, in his 1993 responsum. In her anal-
ysis of the early rabbinic aylonit, Sarra Lev focuses on Turner’s Syndrome but 
also considers CAIS.43 Nor is it a novelty that a Jew with an XY/fg condition 
would be a halakhic female. After all, Waldenberg’s 1970 pediatric case appar-
ently involved an AIS infant (see above), whom he designates as a halakhic 
female. Still, this test case paves the way for the necessary designation of certain 
intersex individuals as female, against their genotype, due to a phenotype that 
matches aylonit status. 
It makes complete sense historically, of course, to infer that any XY/fg 
person would have been raised as a female in pre-modern Jewish communi-
ties. After all, medieval and early modern rabbis had no information about the 
genotype of persons with an XY/fg condition; they could only examine the 
manifestly female physical appearance. We can only speculate that the rare 
Jew with an XY/fg condition would have been designated as an aylonit, given 
situations where she or third parties sought a rabbinic designation. In fact, 
one XY sex reversal case was almost identified as an aylonit. Menashe Klein 
encountered a woman who had begun hormone therapy and, after visiting a 
physician for infertility, discovered that she had XY chromosomes. Klein was 
told that the woman’s condition was rare (“only one such case exists in his-
tory”). She had a functioning uterus, which is not typical for female (XY/fg) 
sex reversal conditions.44After wondering if she might be an aylonit, however, 
Klein avoids the aylonit status because she did not have all the aforementioned 
indicia. He reports that the woman had feminine breasts, voice, and other 
signs of not being aylonit. He does not entertain the possibility that, were it 
not for hormone therapy, she might have presented more of the classical cri-
teria for aylonit.45
43Berra et al., “Long-term Health Issues of Women with XY Karyotype,” p. 300 n. 17.
44It may have been a sex reversal associated with CAH (congenital adrenal hyperpla-
sia) or like the rare case of “a completely normal female phenotype, including uterus and 
histologically normal ovaries” (A. Biason-Lauber et al., “Ovaries and Female Phenotype in 
a Girl with 46, XY Karyotype and Mutations in the CBX2 Gene,” The American Journal of 
Human Genetics, Vol. 84, No. 5 [2009]: 658–663).
45Menashe Klein, Mishneh Halakhot T VI:47. Klein may have been reluctant to assign 
her aylonit status for the sake of her marriage. He notes, seemingly relieved, that he was not 
asked to rule on the aylonit question. 
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Were halakhic gender determined by genotype, then Jewish law would 
require every XY/fg newborn to be raised as a male. However, this would con-
travene both established medical opinion and the Talmudic law of aylonit. A 
genotypic assignment for XY/fg would also overturn centuries of presumed 
precedents in Jewish communities, which undoubtedly accepted XY/fg per-
sons as females. Therefore, the XY/fg test case demonstrates that, as a general 
formula for Jewish law, the genotypic derivation of gender is untenable.
C. Over-generalized Genes
If the preceding analysis of Jewish law is correct, then the sweeping genotypic 
decision rule for sex assignment deserves to be rethought, perhaps retracted. 
How did this rule come about? To be sure, it makes sense that rabbis would 
have worked toward some kind of across-the-board decision rule, given the 
character of halakhic thinking and the available medical evidence. Rabbinic 
thinkers often move toward the abstraction of decision-making principles, 
building from both existing principles and from discrete cases. For his inter-
sex case, Waldenberg relied on a phenotype principle he had formulated for a 
1967 sex change case. While some individual senior decisors (poskim) did not 
articulate an across-the-board formula, a decision rule was derived from their 
analyses by mediating scholars, such as Steinberg or Tendler. Furthermore, 
since intersex is so rare and corrective surgery so recent, both the contempo-
rary decisors and the mediating scholars had no clear pre-modern precedents 
and few actual cases to judge.
Neither the genotypic nor phenotypic approach can lay claim to compel-
ling reasoning or legal precedents. Suffice it to say, neither approach relies on 
clearcut positions in the Hebrew Bible or the Talmud, the bedrock founda-
tions of Jewish law. Instead, each approach cobbles together a sui generis set 
of analogies, interpretations of aggadah (non-legal rabbinic literature), and 
legalistic arguments. For the genotype approach, key sources include a me-
dieval commentary, by Ibn Ezra, on the prohibition on homosexual relations 
(Lev. 18:22), which speculates that the verse refers to a vagina-type opening 
fashioned in a man. For the phenotype approach, key sources include the pre-
modern responsa invoked by Waldenberg, cited above.46 
Given the abstract nature of the debate, then, rabbinic scholars could 
view the discursive landscape as a dispute between two mutually plausible for-
mulae. For his intersex case, Waldenberg relied on a phenotype principle he 
46Waldenberg also ponders the hypothetical marriage annulment of Elijah the Proph-
et, who went to heaven without dying, and a speculative view of the Minchat Chinuch. 
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had formulated for a sex change case. For the genotype principle, mediating 
scholars like Tendler and Steinberg drew upon halakhic decisions by Feinstein, 
Auerbach, Grosnass, and M. Steinberg. These senior rabbinic judges do not 
mention genotype per se, though they clearly reject a phenotype approach.
However, the mediating Jewish scholars did not fully distinguish these 
authoritative decisions by the type of intersex syndrome. Had they focused 
on the medical differences among the cases, they would have recognized that 
at least two cases (Waldenberg 1970 and Klein 1993) were unusual insofar 
as genotype and phenotype were naturally mismatched. In these early years, 
as rabbinic judgments took shape, scientists were still trying to understand 
intersex variations and treatment outcomes. In 1970, for example, Walden-
berg presumably did not know that he was tackling the gender assignment 
for a CAIS infant, nor could he know about CAIS adult outcomes and its 
comparative status to other intersex diagnoses. In line with the state of medi-
cal knowledge, rabbinic discourse assumed a quite limited number of intersex 
variations. Neither scientists nor rabbis were aware of the diversity of geno-
type and phenotype DSD combinations. Conceivably, the problem may have 
been compounded by the structure of Talmudic knowledge, which seemed 
to have few categories (i.e., androginos and tumtum) to line up with intersex 
conditions.47 As a result, halakhists over-generalized the biomedical details 
and assumed that a single decision-rule could work for all cases of intersex or 
ambiguous genitalia.
Though legal reasoning was not itself decisive, it does appear that Or-
thodox rabbis and medical ethicists were drawn to the genotype approach be-
cause of two policy concerns. First, Orthodox decisions over pediatric intersex 
surgery were shaped by the concurrent controversy over sex change surgery 
policy for transsexuals. Regardless of their dispute over genotypic or pheno-
typic gender, halakhic authorities agreed that sex change surgery irreversibly 
violates biblical law. Orthodox Jewish policy-makers strongly opposed sex 
change surgery on strictly legal (halakhic) as well as broader theological and 
cultural grounds. Yet only the genotype approach rejects, by definition, the 
gender reassignment sought by transsexuals. This rejection matches the often 
harsh tone of rabbinic rhetoric against transsexuality.48 The Orthodox rabbis 
47Orthodox rabbis have been understandably reluctant to apply the problematic status 
of androginos to intersex conditions, except for the rare ovotesticular DSD (“true hermaph-
rodite”). For a fascinating reliance on Talmudic rather than medical knowledge of the sexual 
development of the human embryo, see Klein,  Mishneh Halakhot, T VI:47. 1993 responsum.
48Transsexualism is condemned in texts from the 1970s as well more recent discourse, 
such as: Hanina Yom Tov Lipa Teitelbaum, “On a Contemporary Matter of Arrogance, 
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who favor genotype avoid the appearance of encouraging or validating post 
facto sex change surgery for transsexuals.49 Hence, it seems plausible that rab-
binic authors disputed Waldenberg’s phenotypic assignment in his 1970 pedi-
atric intersex case, in part, because his 1967 analysis had employed the same 
reasoning to affirm gender reassignment through sex change surgery. 
Yet rabbinic scholars may have drawn too hastily the analogy between 
intersex and transsexual situations. For better or worse, Waldenberg applied 
the phenotype formula to both an intersex infant (1970) and, apparently, to 
sex change surgery (1967).50 It is my conjecture that other rabbis disagreed 
strongly with the phenotypic outcome for sex change surgery, which accom-
modates the transsexuals’ desired gender reassignment.51 In opposing the 
application of surgically modified phenotype to transsexuals, halakhists pro-
moted the general rule of genotype and, then, incorrectly assumed that the 
genotype rule would work for all intersex conditions. Specifically, the geno-
typic view overlooked or disregarded the halakhic classification necessary for 
females with XY/fg.
Second, the Orthodox genotypic approach of the 1970s confronted, in 
effect, another controversial policy: a medical protocol in the U.S. and Europe 
for XY children. During the 1970s and 1980s, it became accepted medical 
practice to surgically alter genetically male infants with atypical (“underviril-
ized” or “micropenis”) genitalia and raise them as females. This medical prac-
tice was grounded on the idea, espoused by John Money, that gender depends 
Changing from Male to Female and Vice Versa,” Ha-Maor, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Kislev-Tevet 
5733/1972): 10–13; Yigal Shafran, “Nitu’akh le-hakhlafat ha-min (Sex change surgery),” 
Techumin, Vol. 21 (2002/5762): 117–120.
49After the fact, Orthodox jurists lean toward compassionate treatment of transsexu-
als as persons. However, genotypic guidelines would not recognize a transsexual’s desired 
gender for many if not all aspects of religious practice. Conversely, transsexuals could be 
reassigned to their new gender for all religious purposes, arguably, by applying a phenotypic 
determination to gender. Nonetheless, later proponents of the phenotypic approach do not. 
See Ben-Ephraim, Sefer Dor Tahepuchot (“The Generation of Perversions”).
50It is by no means certain that Waldenberg should be understood as supporting hal-
akhic sex reassignment for transsexuals, given careful readings of his 1967 responsum as 
well as his 1997 opinion (Tzitz Eliezer XXII:2, see fn. 9), which takes a different tack to 
sex change surgery. See Shafran, “Nitu’akh le-hakhlafat ha-min (Sex change surgery)” and 
Hillel Lavery-Yisraeli (private correspondence).
51For a rabbinic analysis that advocates genotype in opposition to sex change surgery, 
see e.g., Hirsch (Noam, Vol. 16, [5733/1973]). Hirsch’s view was well received by Steinberg 
and Bleich.
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less on nature (i.e., genotype) than nurture. In 1975, Money described the core 
idea: “Gender identity is sufficiently incompletely differentiated at birth as to 
permit successful assignment of a genetic male as a girl. Gender identity then 
differentiates in keeping with the experiences of rearing.”52 Money believed 
that gender is flexible enough to be molded by upbringing, especially if the 
parents are comfortable with the child’s appearance (i.e., phenotype). Gen-
der identity was to be molded by hormonal treatment and surgery on atypi-
cal, intersexed, or ambiguous genitalia. Money’s policy was accepted by the 
medical community and popular press. However, some American Orthodox 
Jewish medical ethicists resisted. Tendler and Rosner clearly insisted that a 
genetic male ought not be surgically recast as a female. Tendler read in the 
U.S. press about Money’s approach and its acceptance in medical circles. He 
and Dr. Rosner wrote their halakhic opinion on ambiguous genitalia in order 
to prevent surgeries that would turn genetic males into females.53 To them, 
gender is not malleable but tied to genotype. 
Incidentally, the Orthodox genotypic gender policy has been vindicated, 
in part, by the increasing criticism of pediatric surgeries predicated on gender 
malleability. Since the 1990s, studies showed that genetic males often rejected 
having been surgically shaped as girls. Indeed, in 1997, it surfaced that Mon-
ey’s most prominent experiment had actually backfired.54 In a 2006 consensus 
52Cited in D. F Swaab, “Sexual Differentiation of the Brain and Behavior,” Best Practice 
& Research Clinical Endocrinology & Metabolism, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2007): 431–444. The ap-
proach was based on the postulates that “(1) individuals are psychosexually neutral at birth 
and (2) healthy psychosexual development is dependent on the appearance of the genitals” 
(M. Diamond and H. K. Sigmundson, “Sex Reassignment at Birth: Long-term Review and 
Clinical Implications,” Archives of Pediatrics & Adolescent Medicine, Vol. 151, No. 3 [1997]: 
298). For an exemplary article from the period, see: J. Money, R. Potter, and C. S Stoll, “Sex 
Reannouncement in Hereditary Sex Deformity; Psychology and Sociology of Habilita-
tion,” Social Science & Medicine (1967), Vol. 3, No. 2 (1969): 207–216. On the problematic 
management of XY infants since the 1950s, see also: J. A Greenberg, “Legal Aspects of 
Gender Assignment,” The Endocrinologist, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2003): 277 and Suzanne Kessler, 
“The Medical Construction of Gender: Case Management of Intersexed Infants,” in Patrick 
D. Hopkins, ed., Sex/ Machine Reading in Culture Gender, and Technology (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 20. 
53Tendler, telephone interview, April 28, 2010. For a general objection to normalizing 
surgery, see Alfred S. Cohen, “Tumtum and Androgynous,” Journal of Halacha & Contem-
porary Society, Vol. 38 (Fall 1999).
54The David Reimer (“John/Joan”) case involved twin boys, one surgically recon-
structed as female following a circumcision accident. However, the surgically altered twin 
did not accept his assignment as a female, sought medical treatments to reverse the earlier 
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statement accepted by the American Association of Pediatrics, surgical man-
agement of intersex conditions is explained but cast in an ambivalent light.55 
Meanwhile, many intersexed persons themselves have spoken out against early 
surgery. At this stage, neither gender malleability nor genotype determinism is 
likely to prevail because proper medical management may vary by syndrome 
and, possibly, on a case-by-case basis given the person’s particular genetic, hor-
monal, and physiological conditions. 
D. Implications of the Test Case against Genotypic Gender 
Assignment
Implications for transsexuality. If the phenotype of intersex persons becomes 
more pivotal in Orthodox halakhic discourse than genotype, this shift could 
open up questions about the Orthodox halakhic status of transsexuals.56 Re-
gardless of the gender assignment method, formulaic or casuistic, the halakhic 
prohibition on contemporary sex change surgery is not expected to change. 
In addition, the test case does not suggest any grounds to modify the halakhic 
disapproval of hormonal or other transitioning between genders. Neverthe-
less, the test case might reshape rabbinic decisions on the gender identity of 
transsexuals following sex change surgery.  Currently, under Orthodox Jewish 
law, elective sex change surgery only alters the physical appearance of Jewish 
transsexuals. But the surgery does not alter halakhic gender. Jewish transsexu-
als continue to be considered the gender of their birth for many purposes: 
the law does not judge the transsexual by appearances.57 For this reason, it is 
feminizing treatments, and married a woman. He eventually committed suicide (Diamond 
and Sigmundson, “Sex Reassignment at Birth”). 
55Hughes et al., “Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex disorders.” For in-
stance, the lack of scientific evidence is noted at 556 and 558. The statement was prepared 
by European and U.S. endocrinologists, then endorsed and republished by the AAP in 
2006. On the parental viewpoint: Ellen K. Feder, “‘In Their Best Interests’: Parents’ Expe-
rience of Atypical Genitalia,” in Erik Parens, ed., Surgically Shaping Children: Technology, 
Ethics, and the Pursuit of Normality (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 
pp. 189–210. On arguments against early surgery, see: Merle Spriggs and Julian Savulescu, 
“The Ethics of Surgically Assigning Sex for Intersex Children,” in David Benatar, ed., Cut-
ting to the Core: Exploring the Ethics of Contested Surgeries (Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2006), pp. 79–96. 
56As noted above, phenotype is the consensus formula in Conservative Judaism. Tech-
nically, this implies that a person who undergoes transition, but not full-scale surgery, can-
not change their halakhic gender status.
57Generally, halakhic gender is stable. Under the genotype approach, a male-to-female 
transsexual (MTF) remains male gender. However, according to some rabbinic opinions, 
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difficult for a religiously observant transsexual to integrate into a community 
that follows Orthodox Jewish law. 
Conceivably, a phenotypic determination of gender could change the hal-
akhic treatment of people who have undergone sex change surgery. Insofar as 
surgery alters their phenotype, transsexuals might be halakhically recognized 
in terms of their newly chosen sexual appearance. This approach would be 
consistent with Waldenberg’s 1967 responsum. From the standpoint of trans-
sexuals, this phenotypic recognition would facilitate their integration within 
Orthodox Jewish communities.58 
Nonetheless, it is fair to say, rabbinic authorities could readily distinguish 
between intersex persons and transsexuals when applying phenotypic gen-
der. Phenotypic gender could be assigned according to a person’s condition at 
birth, as with intersex conditions, and not assigned for surgical or prosthetic 
alterations, as with transsexuals.59 Alternatively, phenotypic reassignment of 
gender might be denied when the external appearances are altered through a 
violation of biblical law (i.e., castration of functional organs). Were rabbinic 
authorities to deny individuals the elective capacity to surgically change their 
halakhic gender, their rabbinic judgment would remain consistent with their 
often strongly worded disapproval of transsexuals. Already, rabbis have cho-
sen to split the application of phenotypic gender, between intersex and trans-
sexual, while staying true to their rhetorical and halakhic stance on sex change 
surgery. Indeed, some Orthodox rabbis have adopted a phenotypic approach 
to intersex and, unlike Waldenberg, simultaneously rejected a halakhic recog-
nition of the surgically modified phenotype of transsexuals.60
Implications for intersex cases. Just as a few elite athletes with female sex re-
versal DSDs have unsettled the binary divide in international sports, such cases 
an MTF, who presents the physical appearance of woman, is expected to behave as a wom-
an in certain social situations. For example, an MTF may be expected to sit on the women’s 
side of the divider (mehitza) in a worship space or, likewise, avoid interacting with men in 
ways forbidden to women. Arguably, insofar as such social behaviors are approved within 
halakhah, the MTF would be properly performing the halakhic gender of female, rather than 
the usual genotypic male assignment. 
58For example, if an MTF were treated as female rather than male, then there would 
be no ambivalence or confusion about her sitting on the female side of the mehitza, being 
alone with other women, or touching other women. Likewise, an FTM would be treated 
as a male with the attendant duties and honors, e.g. counting for a prayer quorum, reading 
scripture, acting as a witness, and so on. 
59Ben-Ephraim, Sefer Dor Tahepuchot (“The Generation of Perversions”). See also fn. 47.
60Ben-Ephraim, Sefer Dor Tahepuchot.
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imply an unanswerable legal challenge within Orthodox Jewish law. AIS-like 
syndromes refute any over-generalized, formulaic approach to gender assign-
ment based on genotype. Instead, the test case (XY/fg) may be said to uphold 
a major Jewish law precedent for the phenotype approach: Waldenberg’s 1970 
pediatric intersex case. Moreover, the challenge to genotype runs deeper. No-
tably, the genotypic formula is also refuted by another kind of DSD: people 
with a male sex reversal. At a rate below 1 in 20,000 male births, individuals 
are born with female genotype (46,XX) and male phenotype.61 The disorder 
is known as XX male syndrome, reported first in De la Chapelle (1972). Rab-
binic law has apparently tackled at least one case of an XX person with male 
genitalia. Rabbi Shaul Breisch handled a pediatric case, an apparent XX sex 
reversal. The child had internal female organs, including a womb, yet appeared 
male from the outside, with a penis and testicles. Breisch argues that the child 
was not an androginos, the halakhic category for a person with both male and 
female genitalia, but rather “a full male in every respect.”62 He forbade surgery, 
recommended by physicians, to align the child’s genitalia with the genotype 
and internal organs. Furthermore, he permitted removal of the female organs, 
since the male phenotype would be definitive. Speculating that the child might 
be surgically changed to a female phenotype, against his opinion, he said that 
future sexual intercourse to impregnate this person constitute a prohibited 
ejaculation, though not a prohibited homosexual act. Thus, Breisch offers the 
view that it is the child’s phenotype at birth that defines gender, not surgically 
altered phenotype: “here it is clear and obvious that because he was a born a 
male his halakhic status would remain male in every respect.”63 
It is crucial to note that the prevailing genotype formula cannot simply 
be replaced, in Orthodox Jewish law, with a uniform phenotypic formula. 
While phenotype does govern the halakhic gender of certain XY/fg people, 
the phenotype formula should not be applied across the board to all intersex 
conditions. Indeed, for some DSDs, phenotypic gender assignment may be 
either contraindicated medically or unstable after puberty.64 Further halakhic 
61See E. Vorona et al., “Clinical, Endocrinological, and Epigenetic Features of the 
46,XX Male Syndrome, Compared with 47,XXY Klinefelter Patients,” Journal of Clinical 
Endocrinology & Metabolism, Vol. 92, No. 9 (September 2007): 3458–3465. The frequency 
estimate covers three 46,XX phenotypes, two of which are male.  
62Sheilat Shaul EH 9.2 
63Sheilat Shaul, EH 9.4
64An unstable sex reversal test case may be found with congenital adrenal hyperplasia 
(CAH) due to 11-beta-hydroxylase deficiency. By way of illustration, ten Jewish (46,XX) 
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analysis may show, consistent with biomedical research, that neither genotype 
nor phenotype is consistently determinative of adult gender. Nevertheless, at 
a minimum, the test case and the Waldenberg precedent prove that pheno-
typic gender applies to sex-reversal situations (i.e., XY/fg) where secondary 
sex characteristics match the aylonit status. 
After 40 years of a stark choice between phenotypic and genotypic gen-
der, religious Jewish communities stand at the brink of a shift in their norma-
tive conception of halakhic gender. The assumption of a single gender formula 
is eroding. Instead, rabbinic thinkers will likely absorb the scientific under-
standing that human sexuality is complex: its boundaries are blurred and, 
though rare, its permutations remarkably diverse. In the near future, it seems 
likely that serious Jewish clinical ethics will adjudicate DSDs by each separate 
syndrome, quite possibly on a case-by-case basis. Meanwhile, as a test case, 
female sex reversals prove that phenotype is a primary factor in Jewish law on 
intersex and must override genotype at times. Specifically, certain individuals 
with female sex reversal syndromes must be classified as an aylonit, as a mat-
ter of Jewish law, because of secondary sex characteristics. As an aylonit, such 
an intersex person is uncontestably female under Jewish law, despite her male 
sex chromosomes. This refutes proponents of a genotypic formula for halakhic 
gender and it affirms Waldenberg’s 1970 responsum based on phenotypic 
gender assignment.
“females were reared as males and diagnosis was often delayed until puberty when breasts 
developed and menses occurred.” See A. Rosler, E. Leiberman, J. Sack, H. Landau, A. Bend-
erly, S. W. Moses, and T. Cohen, “Clinical Variability of Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia 
due to 11-beta-hydroxylase Deficiency,” Hormone Research, Vol. 16 (1982): 133–141. See 
also Online Mendelian Inheritance in Man, “Congenital adrenal hyperplasia due to 11-beta-
hydroxylase deficiency,” http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/dispomim.cgi?id=202010. 
